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Smith et al. (1988) reported large bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets, a
result that has been replicated by a large literature. Here we test whether the occurrence
of bubbles depends on the experimental subjects’ cognitive sophistication. In a two-part
experiment, we first run a battery of tests to assess the subjects’ cognitive sophistication
and classify them into low or high levels of cognitive sophistication. We then invite them
separately to two asset market experiments populated only by subjects with either low
or high cognitive sophistication. We observe classic bubble- crash patterns in the sessions
populated by subjects with low levels of cognitive sophistication. Yet, no bubbles or
crashes are observed with our sophisticated subjects. This result lends strong support to
the view that the usual bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets are caused by
subjects’ confusion and, therefore, raises some doubts about the external validity of this
type of experiments.
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1 Introduction
In 1988, Econometrica published a seminal paper by Vernon Smith, Gerry Suchanek and
Arlington Williams (SSW) (Smith et al. (1988)) reporting the results of experiments on
the efficiency of asset markets. In the simple market they had designed, SSW observed
large bubbles and crashes. To the surprise of most, these bubbles turned out to be
extremely resilient to replications under different treatments.1,2
Thus, the results became canonical to the extent that seldom a paper in the economic
experimental literature has spawned such a large industry of replications and follow-ups.
Steven Palan in a recent survey (Palan (2013)) documents the main findings based on
the results from 41 published papers, 3 book chapters and 20 working papers, describing
them under 32 observations. Palan concludes with an optimistic appraisal: “Hundreds
of SSW markets have been run, yielding valuable insights into the behavior of economic
actors and the factors governing bubbles”(p. 570).
We are not so sure about that. We show below that the bubbles and crashes observed
in experimental asset markets disappear when the participants have a sufficient level of
cognitive sophistication. This being so, it is problematic to sustain that these experiments
yield valuable insights into the behavior of economic actors or into the factors governing
bubbles, as their external validity becomes questionable. If we are right, bubbles and
crashes stop being intrinsic to experimental asset markets, and become dependent on the
cognitive profile of the experimental subjects.
The idea that the observed bubbles and crashes in the SSW-type experiments may be
due to some lack of understanding by the participants in the experiments is not entirely
new. Huber and Kirchler (2012) and Kirchler et al. (2012) have managed to reduce
bubbles in their experiments by either offering a more thorough rendering of the market
1E.g.: Porter and Smith (1995), Caginalp et al. (1998), Caginalp et al. (2000), Smith et al. (2000),
Dufwenberg et al. (2005), Noussair and Tucker (2006), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), Haruvy et al. (2007),
Hussam et al. (2008), Williams (2008).
2In a recent interview Vernon Smith reminisced about his earlier experiments and declared that the
design of his SSW experiment was transparent and, consequently, he could not understand why subjects
would not trade at the fundamental value: “We then turned to asset markets in the 1980s, and we started
with a very transparent market, an asset that could be re-traded but there was a yield, a dividend on it
that was common information. And we thought that would be very simple. It would be transparent and
people would trade at fundamental value. Well, wrong [...] These markets are very subject to bubbles
in the lab. And people get caught up in self-reinforcing expectations of rising prices. We don’t know
where that comes from. It’s incredible, but they do.” http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2014/11/
vernon_smith_on_2.html. November 17 2014.
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(using graphs and describing what the fundamental values for the asset are in each period)
or describung the asset as a “stock from a depletable gold mine”. According to them, an
easier understanding of the market diminishes the bubbles. However, this interpretation
has been challenged. Baghestanian and Walker (2014) argue that particular features
of the experimental design by Kirchler et al. (2012) generate asset prices equal to the
fundamental value through increased focalism or anchoring, and not because agents are
less confused.
In this paper we test whether the occurrence of bubbles in SSW-type experiments
depends on the subjects’ cognitive sophistication, as we conjecture that some degree of
confusion may be the main driver behind the bubbles. If this is right, then we should
expect participants who are more cognitively sophisticated to generate fewer bubbles com-
pared to less sophisticated ones. To test this hypothesis we design a two-part experiment:
In the first part we invite subjects to participate in a battery of tasks that, we reasonably
believe, allow us to approximate their “cognitive sophistication”. In part two, which is
scheduled for a later date, we invite subjects that score low (high) in our tasks of cognitive
sophistication to participate in an asset market experiment populated only by low (high)
sophistication subjects. The results of the experiment verify our expectations. Bubbles
and crashes persist when the experimental subjects are selected because of their lower
cognitive scores, but vanish when we run the experiment with the more sophisticated
subjects.
2 The Cognitive Tasks
A total of 352 subjects participated in our cognitive tasks. Sessions were run at the
Experimental Economics Laboratory of the Berlin University of Technology. Most of
our subjects were undergraduates in the fields of engineering or economics, who were
asked to participate in a number of time-constrained tasks to evaluate their cognitive
abilities. They began with a “Cognitive Reflection Test” (CRT)(Frederick (2005), followed
by playing a “Guessing Game” (Nagel (1995)) against other subjects, then a “Guessing
Game Against Oneself”, and finally 12 rounds of “Race to 60”.3 There was no feedback
to the participants during or in-between tasks.
3The instructions for the cognitive tasks are presented in Appendix A.
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The CRT is a three-item task of an algebraic nature, designed to measure the ability
to override an intuitive response that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection
that leads to the correct response. It has been shown that the test results are highly
correlated with IQ level, with compliance to expected utility theory, as well as with lower
discount rates (higher patience) for short horizons and lower levels of risk aversion (see
e. g. Frederick (2005) and Oechssler et al. (2009)). With respect to experimental asset
markets, Corgnet et al. (2014) and Noussair et al. (2014) find that CRT scores correlate
positively with earnings. In the Guessing Game (against others), participants were asked
to guess a number between 0 and 100 and were paid based on how close their choice was
to 2/3 of the average of all the guesses within their session. The guess gives an indication
of the participant’s capacity to perform iterative reasoning in a strategic environment. A
simpler way (because devoid of any strategic concerns) of testing the basic capacity for
iterative reasoning is the Guessing Game Against Oneself, where a participant has to pick
two numbers between 0 and 100, and each number is paid independently, according to how
close it is to 2/3 of the average of the two chosen numbers.4 Finally, participants played
Race to 60, a variant of the race game (Gneezy et al. (2010), Levitt et al. (2011)), for 12
rounds against a computer. In this game, the participants and the computer sequentially
choose numbers between 0 and 10, which are added up. Whoever is first to push the sum
to or above 60 wins the game. The game is solvable by backward induction, and the first
mover can always win. Subjects always move first and therefore, independently of the
computer sophistication, they can always win the game by applying backward induction.
We finally computed an index of cognitive sophistication, Si, as a weighted average of
the results obtained by each subject (i) in the four tasks described above. This index has
a value between zero and one, and we use it to rank our subjects. A subject is classified
as having Low (High) cognitive sophistication if she is in the lower (upper) 30% of the
distribution of Si.
5 We counted 84 subjects with low sophistication and 83 with high
sophistication.6
4To our knowledge, this is the first experiment in which a guessing game against oneself is played.
Petersen and Winn (2014) have a similar setup in which subjects compete against themselves in a mo-
nopolistic competition environment.
5See Appendix B for detailed results of each task, the construction of the Cognitive Sophistication
measure Si, as well as its final distribution.
6After the first batch of sessions, and in order to run three additional High sessions (see 4.2 below for
an explanation), we invited more subjects to be tested at a later time. We classified these subjects as
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3 The Experiment
All sessions of the asset market experiment followed the design of Haruvy et al. (2007),
except that our subjects participated in groups of seven (instead of nine), we did not allow
for practice runs, and had three (instead of four) repetitions of the market. Subjects were
endowed with a bundle composed of Talers (our experimental currency) and a number of
assets. Three subjects received 1 asset and 472 Taler, one subject received 2 assets and
292 Taler, and three subjects received 3 assets and 112 Taler.7 Each session consisted of
three repetitions (that are called rounds) and each round lasted 15 periods. In each period
subjects were able to trade units of the asset (called “shares” in the instructions) in a
call market with other subjects.8 At the end of every period, each share paid a stochastic
dividend of either 0, 4, 14 or 30 Taler with equal probability (expected dividend, 12
Taler). Shares had no buy back value at the end of the 15 periods. Before any trade
took place, subjects were asked to predict the price of the asset for all upcoming periods.
So, in period 1 subjects were asked to predict 15 prices, in period 2 they were asked to
predict 14, and so on. Subjects were incentivized to give accurate predictions: They were
paid 5 extra Taler if a price prediction was within 5% of the actual price, 2 Taler if a
prediction was within 25%, 1 Taler if a prediction was within 50% of the price, and nothing
otherwise.9 At the end of each period, subjects were told the price at which the asset
was traded, the dividend they collected, their profits, their share and cash holdings, and
being of High Sophistication if they were above the boundaries of our first batch of tested subjects. In
total we ended up inviting 92 subjects with high scores. Participants who were not classified as having
either Low or High cognitive sophistication, i. e. the remaining 40%, were not subjects in the asset
market experiment.
7Subjects knew about their private endowment and were told that participants could have different
endowments.
8The SSW-type of asset market experiment has been run in the literature with different institutional
arrangements, basically either a continuous double auction or a call market. A call market, as in Haruvy
et al. (2007), allows only one price per period, as opposed to the possibility of multiple prices in the
continuous double auction, thus yielding a crisp description of the price dynamics. It also helps partici-
pants to better understand the price prediction process, and mitigates the possibility of subjects trying
to manipulate prices to improve their prediction scores. Importantly, these advantages come at no cost,
as call markets and continuous double auction markets do not differ in their results. See Palan (2013)
(in particular his Observation 27: “A two-sided sealed-bid call auction does not significantly attenu-
ate the bubble”) for a detailed discussion on the matter and references to experiments comparing both
institutions.
9Notice that subjects were paid independently for all predictions they made of the price for a certain
period. For example, for the price in period 2 subjects were paid twice; once for the prediction they made
in period 1, and once again for the prediction they made in period 2.
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their accumulated profits from their price predictions. Each session (which, as mentioned
above, is composed of three rounds) was programmed to last for two and a half hours,
but a few sessions went somewhat beyond.10
Before turning to the results, recall that our experiment had two different treatments:
• Low Sophistication treatment: all subjects that took part in this treatment were
from the lower 30% of the distribution for Si
• High Sophistication treatment: all subjects that took part in this treatment were
from the upper 30% of the distribution for Si,
and that the main purpose of the experiment was to compare the asset price dynamics
in the two treatments.
4 Results
4.1 Low Sophistication Treatment
We ran six sessions of the experiment under the Low Sophistication treatment. The
results in all six sessions are the usual ones reported in the literature. The diagram
on the left of Figure 1 shows the price dynamics for the first round of each of the six
sessions. Prices begin below the fundamental value of the asset, climbing in the following
periods well above and beyond it, to finally crash near the last period. In summary,
when the experimental subjects belong to the lower end of the distribution of Cognitive
Sophistication, we observe the classic price dynamics of bubbles and crashes.11 As in
previous experiments reported in the literature, bubbles tend to diminish somewhat in
the second and third round of a session with the same subjects and endowments.12
10The instructions for the experiment can be found in Appendix C.
11It is worth mentioning that while subjects that participated in the Low treatment performed relatively
poorly in the cognitive tests, the population tested was made of students from one of the top engineering
schools in Germany. There is no reason to suspect that their cognitive sophistication was below that of
the average undergraduate participating in the usual asset market experiments. The results observed in
the three rounds of the sessions add credence to this assumption.
12The second and third rounds of each session are not the focus of this paper. Therefore, they are not
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Figure 1: Asset prices in the first rounds of the two treatments: Six sessions in the Low Sophistication
treatment (on the left) and nine sessions in the High Sophistication treatment (on the right). The diagonal
line corresponds to the asset fundamental value.
4.2 High Sophistication Treatment
Under the High Sophistication treatment we ran a total of nine sessions where all subjects
were chosen from to the upper 30% of the distribution of Si. In six of these sessions
subjects were told that everyone in the session had “scored above average” in the cognitive
tasks. The results for these six High Sophistication sessions are striking by how markedly
they differ from the standard results of bubbles and crashes. In all six sessions, asset prices
track the fundamental value (almost) perfectly, as shown in the diagram on the right of
Figure 1 with the labels Sessions 1 to 6. While in both treatments, Low and High,
prices start below the fundamental value (as one would expect if subjects are risk averse
and begin the experiment by testing the market), in the High Sophistication treatment
prices reach the fundamental value sooner and hover close to it for the remaining periods.
Because we were in doubt whether the disappearance of the bubbles was due to the high
cognitive scores of the experimental subjects or to their shared knowledge of it, we ran
three additional sessions. These sessions were populated by High Sophistication subjects
who were not told that they had been selected because of their high scores (dashed lines in
Figure 1 with labels NoCo1 to 3). Again, we observe that prices approach the fundamental
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value of the asset from below and stay close to it for the remaining periods. In essence,
as before, bubbles and crashes vanish. Since we do not observe any differences whether
subjects share or not a knowledge for their common sophistication, we pool the nine
sessions together in the graph to the right of Figure 1, to facilitate the comparison with
the Low Sophistication treatment on the left of it. In the second and third round of the
High Sophistication treatment we observe basically the same price dynamics.13
5 Discussion
In order to formally compare the asset price dynamics in our two treatments, we make
use of the two standard bubble measures by (Stöckl et al. (2010)). These measures are
relative absolute deviation (RAD) and relative deviation (RD). We also use a measure
of our own, which we call positive deviation (PD). This last measure is analogous to RD
except that it only takes into account positive deviations from the fundamental value, i.e.


















max{0, (Pt − FVt)/FV }, (3)
where Pt and FVt denote the observed price and the fundamental value in period t
respectively. The number of total periods is N = 15, and Npos denotes the number of
rounds in which the deviations from the fundamental have a positive sign. In Figure 2 we
show the values of all three measures (RAD, RD and PD) for the first round across all
sessions: dots correspond to the six Low Sophistication sessions and triangles to the nine
High Sophistication sessions. The values of the three measures for the High Sophistication
sessions have a low variance and are grouped together close to zero (the means are 0.077,
13 In two of the nine sessions in this treatment, prices tend to rise somewhat towards the end of the
third round. We do not attribute any significance to this pattern, which might well be due to simple
boredom from the previous uneventful rounds. See Appendix D for additional comments.
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Figure 2: Bubble measures RAD, RD, and PD in the first rounds for all sessions. Dots and triangles
represent Low Sophistication and High Sophistication respectively. P -values were calculated by use of
Mann-Whitney U-tests.
−0.004, and 0.036, for RAD, RD, and PD, respectively), confirming that in this treatment
asset prices stay close to the fundamental value. In contrast, the values of the three
measures for the Low Sophistication sessions are dispersed with means above zero (means
are 0.70, 0.10, and 0.33 for RAD, RD and PD, respectively)14. A Mann-Whitney U-test
(p-values for RAD, RD and PD are 0.002, 0.955 and 0.002, respectively), indicates that we
can safely reject the hypothesis that RAD and PD values come from the same distribution
in the two treatments.
As mentioned above, in every period subjects were asked to predict asset prices for
the actual and the remaining periods of the round before posting a bid or ask. These
predictions were incentivized to nudge subjects to give their best guess of present and
future prices. Figure 3 shows the average predictions (over the first rounds of all sessions)
for the Low (left) and High (right) treatments respectively. One axis indicates the period
in which the prediction was elicited (t), while the other shows the predictions for all
remaining periods (16 − t). The coloring of the bars indicates their height, with lighter
colors representing higher price predictions and darker colors representing lower price
14While RAD aggregates the absolute distances of the prices to the fundamental values, and therefore,
the larger the deviations above and below, the larger is the value it takes, RD can give a result close
to zero even if the distances from below and from above are large, provided they are similar in absolute
value.
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Figure 3: Average price predictions in the Low Treatment (left) and High Treatment (right). “Period of
Elicitation” indicates the period in which the price predictions are made. “Period Forecasted” indicates
the periods for which the predictions are made. The colors of the bars code for the average prices
predicted, from beige for high prices to dark blue for low ones.
predictions.15
In the Low Treatment, we observe the color pattern running perpendicular to the x -
axis as subjects, in each period of elicitation, do not anticipate the price changes across the
remaining periods. In contrast, in the High Treatment, bar colors remain unaltered along
the x -axis, indicating that subjects on average predicted the same price for each period
independently of the period in which prices were elicited. In other words, they anticipated
from the beginning of the experiment what was bound to happen and, therefore, did not
have to change their predictions as the experiment proceeded. For a different view of the
predictions, in Figure 4 we present a rotation of Figure 3 that offers a frontal perspective of
the axis describing the period of elicitation. This view shows the price predictions stacking
on top of each other, with the highest prediction for each period topping the column. In
addition, to facilitate the comparison, we plot a line, representing the observed (average)
prices at each period.
In a nutshell, Figures 3 and 4 show that in the Low Treatment subjects keep adjust-
ing their predictions to the current price, such that there is little difference between the
15While we included the numerical values on the z -axis, it is easier to read the levels of the price
predictions from their color coding, as the perspective distorts the vertical view.
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Figure 4: Average price predictions in the Low treatment (left) and High treatment (right). The (red)
line plots the observed average price at each period
current price and their next-price prediction. Instead, in the High Treatment, the price
predictions stay very close to the fundamental values, and so do the actual prices. Such
different patterns of price expectations between Low Sophistication and High Sophisti-
cation participants bring further support to the hypothesis that subjects’ confusion is at
the root of the bubbles and crashes typically observed in the asset experimental mar-
kets. Low Sophistication subjects are apparently lost, their incentivized price predictions
merely mimicking the current observed price, unable to anticipate what is coming next.
High Sophistication subjects, on the contrary, appear to understand what the experiment
is all about. They predict well, and bubbles basically vanish in their sessions.
6 Conclusion
Our goal was to test the hypothesis that bubbles and crashes observed in experimental
asset markets are due to the subjects’ lack of cognitive sophistication. We use a battery
of cognitive tests to separate our pool of subjects into two groups (High and Low Sophis-
tication) and run separate experiments with each group. The results are striking. While
the asset markets populated by Low Sophistication subjects show the usual pattern of
bubbles and crashes, these vanish when the experimental subjects belong to the High
Sophistication group. Such results lend strong support to the hypothesis that the bubbles
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and crashes observed in experimental asset markets are caused by subjects’ confusion with
the experiment and consequently, raise some questions about the external validity of this
type of experiments. Incidentally, if subjects are confused by the relatively simple design
of the asset market described in the paper, then the results of more complex experiments
should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt.
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A Instructions
The instructions below are translated from the original German instructions. The in-
structions were read aloud to the participants.
Overview This is the first part of a two-part experiment. The second part will take
place this coming Friday, November 7th, 2014. Depending on your decisions in this
experiment you may be invited to the second part of the experiment. However, not all
participants of this experiment will be invited to the second part. The experiment today
is made up of several games and questionnaires. After each game/questionnaire, you will
receive new instructions for the next game/questionnaire. In total, the experiment will
take approx. one hour. For your participation you will receive a minimum payment of 5
Euro. Depending on your actions during the experiment you can earn more than that.
After all questionnaires and games are done, your payoff will be shown on your monitor.
You will then be handed a receipt in which you enter your earned payoff as well as your
name and address. Please go then to the adjoining room to receive your payment.
Quiz In this quiz, we ask you to answer three questions of differing difficulty. Please try
to answer as many of them as possible. You have 5 minutes of time, and you will receive
one Euro for each question answered correctly.
Game 1 In this game you choose a number between 0 and 100 (both included). The
other participants also choose a number between 0 and 100. Your payoff depends on how
far away your number is from 2/3 of the average of all chosen numbers (yours included).
The closer your number to 2/3 of the average, the higher your payoff. Your payoff is
calculated as follows:
Payoff (in Euro) = 1− 0.05 ∗ |your number− 2/3 ∗ average|
In words: your payoff (in Euro) is calculated as 1 minus 0.05 times the absolute difference
between your number and two thirds of the average of all chosen numbers. Since the
absolute difference (as indicated by the absolute value bars “|”) is used, it does not
matter whether your number is above or below two thirds of the average. Only the
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absolute distance is used to calculate your payoff. The smaller the difference, i.e. the
distance of your number to two thirds of the average of the chosen numbers, the higher
your payoff. Please note that your payoff cannot be negative. If your payoff, as calculated
with the above formula, turns out to be negative, then you will receive 0 Euro. Since the
payoff for the other participants is calculated in the same way, they too have an incentive
to choose a number that is as close as possible to 2/3 of the average. You are playing this
game with all other participants that are presently in the room. You have 90 seconds to
enter your number.
Game 2 This game is very similar to the game played before. Again, it is your goal to
choose numbers that are as close as possible to 2/3 of the average. This time, however,
you will be playing against yourself. You are playing the same game as before, only this
time the only player with whom you play, is yourself. This time you will be asked to enter
two numbers between 0 and 100 (both included), and your payoff will depend on how
close your numbers are to two thirds of the average of the two numbers that you chose.
Since you play against yourself, the average number equals your first chosen number plus
your second chosen number, divided by two. This time you will be paid twice, once for
each number you choose. The payoff for your first chosen number is calculated as:
Payoff (in Euro) = 0.5− 0.05|Number1− 2/3 ∗ [((Number1 + Number2))/2]|,
where Number1 is the first chosen number, and Number2 is the second chosen number.
Your payoff for your second chosen number is calculated as:
Payoff (in Euro) = 0.5− 0.05|Number2− 2/3 ∗ [((Number1 + Number2))/2]|,
You have 90 seconds to enter both numbers.
Game 3 (Race to 60) In this game, you play several repetitions of the game “Race
to 60”. Your goal is to win this game as often as possible against the computer. In this
game you and the computer alternately choose numbers between 1 and 10. The numbers
are added up, and whoever chooses the number that pushes the sum of numbers to or
above 60 wins the game. In detail, the game works as follows: You start the game against
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the computer, by choosing a number between 1 and 10 (both included). Then the game
follows these steps: The computer enters a number between 1 and 10. This number is
added to your number. The sum of all chosen numbers so far is shown on the screen. If
the sum is smaller than 60, you again enter a number between 1 and 10, which in turn
will be added to all numbers chosen so far by you and the computer. This sequence is
repeated until the sum of all numbers is above or equal to 60. Whoever (i.e. you or the
computer) chooses the number that adds up to a sum equal or above 60 wins the game.
You will be playing this game 12 times against the computer. For each of these games
you have 90 seconds of time. For each game won, you receive 0,5 Euro.
17
B Index of Cognitive Sophistication
The index Si used to rank participants is constructed according to the following weighted
average:
Si = 1/3∗CRTni+1/3∗(0.5∗DistanceOSni+0.5∗Selfni)+1/3∗(0.5∗Raceni+0.5∗MeanBIni)
CRTn: CRTn is the normalized result of the number of correct answers for the CRT
questions (if all three answers are correct, CRTn=1, if only two are correct, CRTn=2/3,









0 .25 .5 .75 1
CRTn
Figure 5: CRTn Distribution
DistanceOSn: The variable DistanceOSn is our measure of how well a subject per-
formed in the guessing game. To construct it we take the following steps. First, we
separate the choices of all subjects (ChoiceOSi) into two groups: those that played a
dominated strategy (i.e. ChoiceOS > 66) and the rest. Those in the former group are
assigned a score of zero for their DistanceOSn. We then define our “objective” value,
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Figure 6: DistanceOSn Distribution
sessions , which is 25.587. With this, we create a measure called Distancei as follows:
Distancei = |(25.587− ChoiceOSi)/(66− 25.587)|,
if ChoiceOSi ≤ 66. This allows us to rank all subjects in a range between zero and one,
with zero being assigned to those players that played exactly the objective value and one
to those subjects that played above 66. In addition, we posit that choosing a number
below the objective value indicates a better understanding of the game than choosing a
number above it. Accordingly, in our measure of cognitive sophistication for the guessing
game we add an extra 50% to the “distance” for any choice above the objective value.
This translates into the following equation:
DistanceOSni = max{0,
1−Distancei ∗ 1.5 if ChoiceOSi > 25.5871−Distancei if ChoiceOSi < 25.587}
Selfn: The measure Selfn, for cognitive sophistication in the “playing against self” game,
is again a two-step procedure. We posit that the game has two dimensions of under-
standing: the first dimension is realizing that the numbers picked should always be close
together (in fact they should be the same); the second dimension is realizing that there
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is a unique correct answer (zero for both choices). In order to evaluate both dimensions
we first measure the distance of each choice (ProximitySelf1 and ProximitySelf2) to 2/3
of the average (AvgSelf) of both:
ProximitySelf1i = |Self1i − 2/3AvgSelf|
ProximitySelf2i = |Self2i − 2/3AvgSelf|
,
where Self1i is the first number chosen and Self
2
i is the second number chosen by subject
i. We then create a normalized measure for the proximity of both values:
NormalizedSelfai = 1− (ProximitySelf1i + ProximitySelfi2)/100
Next we compute the second measure:
Normalizedselfbi = 1− (Self1i + Self2i )/200,
which penalizes subjects for picking numbers away from the solution of the game.




Racen: This measure is the normalization of the number of rounds won by each subject
in the Race to 60 game (Woni):
Raceni = Woni/12
MeanBIn This measure is the average number of backward induction steps (MeanBIn)
that a subject made during the 12 Rounds of Race to 60. Race to 60 has a correct path
[5, 16, 27, 38, 49, 60] that allows the first mover to always win the game. The number
of backward induction steps is dependent on when a subject enters this optimal path
and stays on it. If a subject starts out with a 5, and then stays on the correct path,
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Figure 9: MeanBIn Distribution
completely. Consequently, if a subject enters the correct path at, say, 38 she thinks three
steps ahead. We then create the measure MeanBIn which is the normalized mean of






It is important to notice that we are able to extract this measure because we varied the
number of backward induction steps the computer made. If our computer had 6 steps of
backward induction, we would not know if a subject is able to make 4 or 3 or 2 backward
induction steps, since the computer will enter the optimal path earlier than a subject with
less than 6 backward induction steps. Our subjects played two rounds against a computer
with one backward induction steps, two rounds against a computer with two backward
induction steps, and so on.
Distribution of Si Finally we present the distribution of Si in Figure 10. Any subject
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Figure 10: Cognitive Sophistication Measure (Si) Distribution. The red dashed lines mark the separation
for Low and High Sophistication subjects
C Asset Market Experiment Instructions
This is the second part of the experiment. [Based on your answers to the questionnaires
and your actions in the games of the first part of the experiment, we have calculated a
“performance score”, that reflects the quality of your decisions. You have been invited
to this experiment today because your score was above average.] [The last two sentences
were only included in the instructions for the “shared-knowledge” High Sophistication
treatment]
Overview This is an economic experiment on decisions in markets. In this experiment
we generate a market, in which you trade units of a fictitious asset with the other partic-
ipants of the experiment. The instructions are not complicated, and if you follow them
closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money.
The money that you earn during the experiment will be paid in cash at the end of the
experiment. The experiment consists of 3 rounds. Each round consists of 15 periods (in
the following also named trading periods) in which you have the opportunity to trade in
the market, i.e. to buy and sell. The currency in which you trade is called “Taler”. All
transactions in the market will be denoted in this currency. The payoff that you receive
will be paid in Euro. You will receive one Euro for every 90 Taler.
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Experiment Software and Market You will be trading in one of two markets, each
of which consists of 7 participants. Both markets are identical in their functionality and
are independent of each other. Your assignment to one of these markets is random, and
you will stay in this market for the duration of the experiment. You can make your
decisions in the market through the experiment software. A screenshot of this software
can be found on the next page. In every trading period you can buy and sell units of an
asset (called “share” from now on). In the top left corner of the screen you can see how
many Taler and shares you have at every moment (see screenshot). In case you want to
buy shares, you can issue a buy order. A buy order contains the number of shares that
you want to buy and the highest price that you are willing to pay per share. In case
you want to sell shares, you can issue a sell order. Similar to the buy order, a sell order
contains the number of shares that you want to sell as well as the lowest price that you
are willing to accept for each share. The price at which you want to buy shares has to be
lower than the price at which you want to sell shares. All prices refer to prices of a single
share.
The experiment software combines the buy and sell orders of all participants and
determines the trading price, at which shares are bought and sold. This price is determined
so that the number of shares with sell order prices at or below this price is equal to the
number of shares with buy order prices at or above this price. All participants who submit
buy orders above the trading price will buy shares, and those that have sell orders below
the trading price will sell shares. Example of how the market works: Suppose there are
four traders in the market and:
• Trader 1 submits a buy order for one share at the price of 60 Taler.
• Trader 2 submits a buy order for one share at the price of 20 Taler.
• Trader 3 submits a sell order for one share at the price of 10 Taler.
• Trader 4 submits a sell order for one share at the price of 40 Taler.
At any price above 40, there are more units offered for sale than units for purchase.
At any price below 20, there are more units offered for purchase than for sale. At any
price between 21 and 39, there is an equal number of units offered for purchase and sale.
The trading price is the lowest price at which there is an equal number of units offered
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for purchase and sale. In this case, the trading price is 21 Taler. Trader 1 buys one share
from Trader 3 at the price of 21 Taler. Trader 2 buys no shares, because her buy order
price is below the trading price. Trader 4 does not sell any shares, because her sell order
price is above the trading price.
Specific Instructions for this Experiment This experiment consist of 3 independent
rounds, each consisting of 15 trading periods. In every period you can trade in the market,
according to the rules stated above. At the start of each round, you receive an endowment
of Taler and shares. This endowment does not have to be the same for every participant.
As mentioned, you can see the amount of shares and Taler that you own on the top
left corner of your screen. Shares have a life of 15 periods. The shares that you have
purchased in one period are at your disposal at the next period. If you happen to own 5
shares at the end of period 1, you own the same 5 shares at the beginning of period 2. For
every share you own, you receive a dividend at the end of each of the 15 periods. At the
end of each period, including period 15, each share pays a dividend of either 0, 4, 14, or
30 Taler, with equal probability. This means that the average dividend is 12 Taler. The
dividend is added automatically to your Taler account at the end of each period. After
the dividend of period 15 has been paid, the market closes and you will not receive any
further dividends for the shares that you own. After this round is finished, a new round of
15 period starts, in which you can buy and sell shares. Since all rounds are independent,
shares and Taler from the previous period are not at your disposal anymore. Instead, you
receive the same endowment of shares and Taler that you had at the beginning of round
one. The experiment consists of 3 rounds with 15 periods each.
Average Holding Value The table “Average Holding Value”, which is attached to
these instructions, is meant to facilitate your choices. The table shows how much dividend
a share pays on average, if you hold it from the current period until the last period, i.e.
period 15 of this round. The first column indicates the current period. The second column
gives the average earnings of a share if it is held from this period until the end of the round.
These earnings are calculated as the average dividend, 12, multiplied by the number of
remaining periods, including the current period.
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Accuracy Your Earnings
Within 10% of actual price 5 Taler
Within 25% of actual price 2 Taler
Within 50% of actual price 1 Taler
Predictions In addition to the money you earn by trading shares, you can earn ad-
ditional money by predicting the trading prices. In every period, before you can trade
shares, you will be asked to predict the trading prices in all future periods. You will
indicate your forecasts in a screen that looks exactly like the screen in front of you. The
cells correspond to the periods for which you have to make a forecast. Each cell is labeled
with the period for which you are asked to make a forecast. The amount of Taler you can
earn with your forecasts is calculated as follows.
You can earn money on each and every forecast. The accuracy is calculated separately
for each forecast. For example, in period 2, your forecast from period 1 and your forecast
from period 2 are evaluated separately. If both forecast are within 10% of the actual price,
you earn 2*5=10 Taler. If one is within 10% of the actual price and one is within 25% of
the actual price, but not within 10%, you earn 5 Taler + 2 Taler = 7 Taler.
Your Payoff For your participation you receive a fixed payment of 5 Euro and a pay-
ment that depends on your actions. The latter part of the payment is calculated for
each round, as the amount of Taler that you have at the end of period 15, after the last
dividend has been paid, plus the amount of Taler you receive for your forecasts. Your
payoff for each round is calculated as:
The amount of Taler you have at the beginning of period 1
+ the dividends you receive
+ Taler that you receive from selling shares
– Taler that you spend on shares
+ Taler that you earn with your forecasts.
The total payment that you receive in Euro consists of the sum of Taler you earn in
all three rounds, multiplied by 1/90, plus the fixed payment of 5 Euro.
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D Second and Third Round Results
In this section we report the results for the second and third round of our market sessions,
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Figure 11: All Rounds Low Markets
In Figure 11 we present the evolution of prices in the Low Sophistication sessions.
As usually found in the literature, prices appear to converge (slowly) to the fundamental
value. We present standard bubble measures for all rounds in Table 1. Indeed, all bubble
measures appear to decrease over rounds, indicating convergence to the fundamental
value. The price dynamics for the High Sophistication treatment are presented in Figure
12. There seems to be a slight increase in deviations from the fundamental value in
the last round, according to the bubble measures in Table 1 This deviation appears to
be concentrated in the late periods of two of the nine sessions, which might very well
indicate, as we mentioned in footnote 13, that some subjects were becoming bored from
the third repetition of an uneventful market.
In this appendix, we also document the price predictions of our two treatments in
rounds 2 and 3. (Figure 13 and 14). Two things are noteworthy in the Low Sophistication
treatment; first, subjects in the second round predict a bubble and crash pattern, which
is akin to what Haruvy et al. (2007) observe in their experiment. Second, in the third
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Figure 12: All Rounds High Markets
predict a falling trajectory of prices instead of the perennial inverted-U shape of round
1 and 2. As in round 1, the price predictions in the High Sophistication treatment track
the fundamental value almost perfectly.
Measure Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Total
mean RAD high 0.077 0.074 0.101 0.084
mean RAD low 0.708 0.308 0.277 0.431
pvalue 0.002 0 0.018 0
mean RD high -0.004 0.065 0.095 0.052
mean RD low 0.105 0.092 0.031 0.148
pvalue 0.955 0.272 0.388 0.529
mean PD high 0.036 0.069 0.098 0.068
mean PD low 0.406 0.2 0.154 0.253
pvalue 0 0.066 0.955 0.008
Table 1: Bubble Measures. P-values are calculated using the Mann-Whitney U-test, the null hypothesis
being that the distributions of the measures in the treatments high and low are identical.
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Figure 13: Price Predictions for Round 2 and 3 of the Low Treatment
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